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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary constitutional adjudication is characterized by an elaborate sys-
tem of judicial review composed of multiple levels of scrutiny.' The presence of three
distinct levels of judicial review, referred to as strict, intermediate, and minimal
scrutiny, is perhaps the most significant feature of current constitutional analysis.
This multi-level system of scrutiny is a relatively modem development that grew out
of the constitutional crisis occasioned by the Supreme Court's clash with Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal.2 That episode proved to be one of the most
traumatic experiences ever suffered by the Supreme Court. 3 Not since the hostile
reaction to its decision in the Dred Scott case had the Court's prestige been at such a
low ebb.4 Attacked from all sides for striking down New Deal legislation needed to
ameliorate the severe conditions of the Depression, the Court was deeply shaken.
5
President Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan challenged the very legitimacy of the
Court to be the final arbiter of the Constitution. 6 With the "switch in time that saved
nine," the Court barely escaped with its authority intact.
7
The lesson was not lost on the Court. Indeed, the Court can be accused of
overreacting to its traumatic collision with the New Deal, for the Court's response
was to renounce its power. It did this by adopting a posture of extreme deference to
the other branches of government. 8 Henceforth the Court would fain uphold the
actions of the other branches of government, granting them a presumption of con-
stitutionality that could be overcome only by showing them to be clearly irrational or
unreasonable. 9 This meant that a party challenging governmental action had the
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difficult burden of proving it to be completely unrelated to any legitimate gov-
ernmental objective at all.' 0 This deferential stance, which has come to be known as
minimal scrutiny," has a deceptive lineage to the past. Minimal scrutiny can be
traced linguistically to some (albeit not many) early cases in which the Court pro-
fessed to bestow a presumption of constitutionality upon governmental conduct. 12 In
the past, however, the presumption of constitutionality was rarely invoked, and when
it was, it was more as a rhetorical formality than as a working principle. 13 After the
New Deal Court struggle, though, the presumption of constitutionality was invoked
frequently, and not just as a matter of rhetoric; it.quickly became a working principle
that was used, as a matter of course.14
When used as a working principle rather than a rhetorical device, the presump-
tion of constitutionality is quite difficult to overcome. It thus provides a high degree
of constitutional deference for the actions of the legislative and executive branches of
government. It did not take the Supreme Court long to realize, however, that this
extreme deference to the other branches of government was not appropriate in all
situations. The Court was quick to see that minimal scrutiny does not provide ade-
quate protection for express constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech,' 5 or for
implicit but nonetheless fundamental rights, such as the right of privacy, 16 or when
governmental action is based upon an individious suspect classification, such as race
or ethnic origin. 17 In all three of these situations, the Court has retained a more
exacting mode of judicial review that requires strict scrutiny of the governmental
conduct in question. Under strict scrutiny, governmental action is not presumed to be
constitutional, and will not be upheld by the Court unless shown to be necessarily
related to a compelling state interest.'
8
As put into operation by the Warren Court, there was a "sharp difference"
between strict and minimal scrutiny.' 9 Scrutiny, that was supposed to be strict in
theory turned out to be fatal in practice, while scrutiny that was supposed to be
minimal in theory turned out to be nonexistent in practice.2" As a result, the Warren
Court's successor, the Burger Court, has formulated yet a third level of judicial
review, which operates as an intermediate form of scrutiny. 2 1 When using in-
10. Id.
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termediate scrutiny, the Court will uphold government conduct if it is substantially
related to an important governmental interest. 22 Intermediate scrutiny was first de-
veloped in equal protection cases as a means of evaluating government classifica-
tions, such as those based upon gender or illegitimacy, 23 that bear at least some of the
characteristics of a suspect classification. 24 More recently, it has been imported for
use in first amendment cases concerning commercial speech, which the Court be-
lieves to be not as fragile as other forms of speech, 25 and in those freedom of speech
cases in which restrictions of expression are unrelated to its ideological content. 26
Intermediate scrutiny allows the Court to take a neutral stance that favors neither the
government nor the party challenging it.
There are, then, three distinct levels, or tiers, of judicial review that are invoked
in their respective spheres. The most pronounced use of the multi-level system, as
well as its fullest development, has occurred in cases arising under the equal protec-
tion clause.2 7 In equal protection decisions spanning the last three decades, the
Supreme Court has engaged in a continual elaboration of the multi-tier system,
attempting to refine it in case after case. 28 Through this extensive experience in equal
protection clause cases, the system may have reached its breaking point. By now
highly rarefied, the system of multi-level scrutiny has suffered several serious strains,
which may reveal that it is fundamentally flawed and destined to collapse.
IL DISSENSION IN THE RANKS: JUDICIAL OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM
A. Criticism of the System
Several Supreme Court Justices have openly criticized the multi-level system of
judicial review. The first to do so was Justice Marshall, in a series of dissenting
opinions beginning in 1970 before the emergence of intermediate scrutiny. 29 Justice
Marshall believes that the multi-tier approach is an oversimplification that does not
accurately reflect the adjudicative process in constitutional cases. 30 He claims that a
principled reading of the Court's decisions reveals a spectrum, or "sliding scale," of
scrutiny that is calibrated by degrees rather than by two or three tiers.31 Under this
conception, the operative degree of scrutiny is determined by the character of the
government classification in question-that is, the extent of its invidiousness-and
22. See supra note 21 (citing eases).
23. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 143-56.
25. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
27. See L. TRIE, supra note 1, at 1000; Gunther, supra note 1, at 8.
28. See Gunther, supra note I, at 8-10.
29. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the relative importance of the individual and state interests affected by the
classification. 3
2
Moreover, Justice Marshall maintains that the multi-level system is a "rigidified
approach ' 33 that hinders proper constitutional analysis in two respects. First, it
misdirects constitutional analysis by deflecting the focus of inquiry toward abstrac-
tions (the tiers of scrutiny) that have little to do with the specific merits of a case. 34
Second, it inhibits constitutional analysis by using a priori definitions (such as
"fundamental right" and "suspect classification") to trigger the operative tier of
scrutiny. 35 Originally, Justice Marshall's criticism was directed at the multi-level
system when it consisted of two tiers, strict and minimal scrutiny. 36 The addition of a
third level of review, intermediate scrutiny, did not address the defects of the system
identified by Justice Marshall, and he has remained critical of the system in its
revised form. 37
While intermediate scrutiny was in an incipient stage, Justice Marshall authored
a majority opinion for the Court in Chicago Police Department v. Mosley, 38 which
offered a single standard of review as an alternative to the multi-tier approach.
Marshall's opinion stated that the crucial question in all equal protection cases is
whether there is "an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered" by the
government regulation in question. 39 This comprehensive inquiry consolidates the
levels (or, as may be the case, the degrees) of scrutiny into a unified formula for all
cases.
Use of the Mosley standard, however, was short-lived, a majority of the Court
evidently preferring to concentrate its attention upon further refining intermediate
scrutiny. Yet, despite the evolution of intermediate scrutiny, dissatisfaction with the
multi-level system has continued to increase on the Supreme Court. In Craig v.
Boren,40 the case in which the precise standards of intermediate scrutiny were first
articulated, 4 1 both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens took occasion to express
their objections to the multi-level approach. In his dissenting opinion in Craig,
Justice Rehnquist first took the stance of a literalist, opposing the enunciation of the
intermediate standard of review on the ground that the equal protection clause "con-
tains no such language." 42 Turning to more practical concerns, he also contended
32. See supra note 29 (citing cases).
33. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
318, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 520.
36. Id.; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,432-33 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
38. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
39. Id. at 95.
40. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that the Court has encountered "enough difficulty" with two tiers of review "to
counsel weightily" against the recognition of yet another tier.
43
Justice Stevens responded to these arguments in a concurring opinion. He agreed
that there is a discrepancy between the use of multiple tiers of review and the fact that
there is only one equal protection clause, which does not direct the courts to apply
one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. 44 Justice
Stevens, however, went on to observe that whatever criticism may be directed toward
a three-level approach "applies with the same force" to a two-level approach.45
Furthermore, Justice Stevens, echoing Justice Marshall before him, described the
multi-level system as obscuring what in reality is a more unitary standard of review.
The system, he was inclined to believe, is not "a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions
that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.' '46
B. Departure from the System
Dissatisfaction with the multi-level system is also manifest in the increasingly
frequent departures from it. The creation of intermediate scrutiny, which itself was a
departure from the two-tier approach, was able to abate further deviation from the
system only temporarily. Thereafter, defections from the system have increased in
number. These defections can be quite pointed, as in the plurality opinion authored
by Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove v. Klutznick,47 which, while approving an
affirmative action program, tersely declined to adopt any tier of review.
48
A similar abandonment of the system occurred in the majority opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist in Rostker v. Goldberg,49 in which the Court was presented with an
equal protection challenge to a federal statute requiring men, but not women, to
register for the draft. 50 In deciding this challenge, the Court was faced with the
dilemma that on the one hand, federal statutes dealing with military affairs are
subjected to only minimal scrutiny, whereas, on the other hand, gender-based classi-
fications are subjected to intermediate scrutiny. 5 1 Rather than resolve this problem,
the Court refused to deal with it, by asserting that there was no reason to further refine
the multi-tier system.52 The levels of scrutiny, continued the Court, "may all too
readily become facile abstractions used to justify a result," 53 which is exactly what
Justice Marshall has been insisting all along.
Another case that marks an apparent conversion to Justice Marshall's way of
thinking is Plyler v. Doe,54 in which the Court utilized a flexible comprehensive
43. Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. Id.
47. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
48. Id. at 492.
49. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
50. Id. at 59.
51. Id. at 64-69.
52. Id. at 69-70.
53. Id.
54. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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standard in lieu of the a priori categories that normally obtain under the multi-tier
approach.55 Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Plyler, striking down a
state law that denied free public education to the children of illegal aliens. Although
the state law fell into none of the categories previously held to invoke either of the
forms of heightened scrutiny (strict or intermediate), the Court nevertheless con-
cluded that the intermediate tier was the appropriate standard of review. 56 This
conclusion was reached through an analysis previously suggested by Justice Mar-
shall, that is, by evaluating the invidiousness of the classification at hand and the
relative importance of the individual and state interests at stake. 57 The Court devoted
six pages to this analysis, 5 8 in the course of which it stated that more was involved in
the case than the "abstract question" of whether the law discriminates against a
suspect class or whether education is a fundamental right.5 9
The opinions in Plyler, Rostker, and Fullilove are self-evident departures from
the multi-tier system. On other occasions, deviation from the system is less blatant,
and is accomplished through a variety of devices: (1) upgrading minimal scrutiny; (2)
downgrading intermediate scrutiny; and (3) carving out exceptions to strict scrutiny.
1. Upgrading Minimal Scrutiny
One technique for upgrading minimal scrutiny is to constrict the deference that it
normally affords for governmental objectives. This was done in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,60 which is one of the few cases in which the
Court, while professing to follow minimal scrutiny standards, nevertheless struck
down legislation. 61 In Moreno, the doomed legislation was an amendment to the
Food Stamp Act that precluded unrelated persons who lived together from eligibility
for food stamps. 6' The legislative history of the amendment indicated that it was
motivated by a desire to penalize "hippies," which the Court held was an illegitimate
governmental goal. 63 This contradicted the Court's usual practice under minimal
scrutiny, which was to deem legislative motive irrelevent64 and to posit hypothetical
or speculative ends for legislation that had no discernible legitimate purpose. 65 By
taking a more critical view of the governmental objective in Moreno, the Court
invested minimal scrutiny with an acuity it ordinarily did not possess.
The same technique was employed more recently in Zobel v. Williams,6 6 which
55. Id. at 218-24.
56. Id. at 224.
57. See supra text accompanying note 32.
58. 457 U.S. 202, 218-24 (1982).
59. Id. at 223.
60. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
61. See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
62. 413 U.S. 528, 529 (1973).
63. Id. at 534-35.
64. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
65. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948).
66. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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involved an Alaska statute distributing annual dividends from windfall oil revenues to
state residents. According to the statute, the value of the dividend paid to each
recipient depended upon his or her length of residency within the state-the longer
the residency, the larger the dividend.6 7 In evaluating this statutory scheme, the Court
was presented with a dilemma similar to the one it faced in Rostker v. Goldberg.
68
Arguably, either strict or minimal scrutiny could appropriately have been applied to
the Alaska legislation, since it possessed some, but not all, of the attributes of a
durational residency requirement, which ordinarily evokes the stricter form of
review. 6 9 Once again the Court sidestepped this dilemma, this time by stating that "if
the statutory scheme cannot pass even the minimal test . . . we need not decide
whether any enhanced scrutiny is called for. ' '70 Then, purportedly using minimal
scrutiny, the Court went on to hold that the Alaska legislation could not be justified
by any of the purposes advanced in its defense. 7' One of those purposes was to
reward citizens for contributions, both tangible and intangible, made in the past to the
state, which the Court held was not a legitimate governmental objective.7 2 To support
this holding, the Court reached beyond the bounds of minimal scrutiny by relying on
two cases, Shapiro v. Thompson73 and Vlandis v. Kline,74 both of which utilized the
strict form of review. And, in rejecting the governmental goal in Zobel, the Court
contravened its usual practice under minimal scrutiny of either accepting or postulat-
ing objectives to bolster the validity of legislation.7 5
It is also possible to upgrade minimal scrutiny by reducing the deference it
customarily allows for governmental means. When utilizing minimal scrutiny, the
Court regularly sustains legislation that bears little, if any, relationship to a legitimate
end, by exercising extreme tolerance for overinclusive and underinclusive legislative
means. 76 This sort of tolerance was notably lacking in both Moreno and Zobel, as
well as in another recent decision, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. ,77 which also
purported to employ the minimal tier of review. In Moreno, the Court ruled that the
amendment in question could not be sustained as a means of preventing fraud,
because it was not rationally related to that purpose. 78 Similarly, in Zobel, the Court
held that the Alaska statute could not be justified as a means of encouraging residence
in the state or of ensuring prudent management of the dividend fund, because it was
67. Id. at 56-57.
68. See supra text accompanying note 51.
69. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 58-60 (1982). For example, the Alaska legislation did not "impose any
threshold waiting period on those seeking dividend benefits." Id. at 58.
70. Id. at 60-61.
71. Id. at 61-64.
72. Id. at 63.
73. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
74. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
75. See supra note 65 (citing cases).
76. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesart v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948).
77. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
78. 413 U.S. 528, 535-38 (1973).
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not rationally related to either of those objectives. 79 In Logan, a majority of the Court
found that a statutory condition requiring the dismissal of a complaint unless a
factfinding conference was convened within 120 days was not rationally related to the
goal of discouraging unfounded claims or of expediting resolution of disputes. 80
Thus, in all three of these decisions the Court restricted the indulgence that normally
prevails under minimal scrutiny for overinclusive and underinclusive legislation, and
thereby sharpened the level of review.
These cases illustrate that minimal scrutiny may be upgraded by granting less
obeisance than usual either to the ends or means of governmental action. Ironically,
the practice of upgrading minimal scrutiny restores that tier to its original form,
which, had it been retained, probably would have obviated the need to create in-
termediate scrutiny. As first conceived by the Supreme Court, minimal scrutiny
provided substantial, but not absolute, deference to the other branches of gov-
erment.81 This was soon modulated to total deference, which led the Court to uphold
governmental action that was not in actuality reasonably related to a legitimate state
interest,8 2 and which widened the gap between the strict and minimal tiers. s3 Had the
original nonabsolute version of minimal scrutiny been maintained, an intermediate
level would not have been necessary to alleviate this situation.
2. Downgrading Intermediate Scrutiny
Despite the felt need for an intermediate tier of review,84 the Court has resorted,
on at least one occasion, to downgrading intermediate scrutiny. This occurred in
Michael M. v. Superior Court,85 in which the Court sustained the constitutionality of
a gender-based classification making only males criminally liable for the act of
statutory rape. 86 The task of writing what turned out to be a plurality opinion in
Michael M. inexplicably was assigned to Justice Rehnquist, who, in a series of
previous cases, had parted company with his colleagues on the Court by objecting to
the use of anything stronger than minimal scrutiny to evaluate gender classifi-
cations.8 7 In Michael M., however, Justice Rehnquist rose to the occasion, and
produced an opinion that is a tour de force of disingenuousness that three other
Justices were somehow willing to join. 88 The first sign of dissimulation appears early
79. 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982).
80. 455 U.S. 422, 438-42 (1982) (separate opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and
O'Connor, J.); 455 U.S. 422, 443-44 (1982) (concurring opinion of Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.).
81. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938).
82. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940);
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
83. Gunther, supra note 1, at 17.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
85. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
86. id. at 466.
87. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Wenglerv. Druggists Mutual
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224-25 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell joined the opinion of Justice Rehnquist. Justices Stewart
and Blackmun each filed concurring opinions. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White and
Marshall. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion.
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in the opinion, with the statement that prior cases show that "the Court has had some
difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis" in cases involving
gender-based classifications.8 9 This statement, of course, neglects to mention that in
previous cases the Court had established beyond a doubt that gender-based classifica-
tions are subject to intermediate scrutiny. 90 Though grudgingly acknowledging the
existence of an intermediate tier of scrutiny, the opinion degrades its character by
portraying it as merely "somewhat" sharper than the minimal tier.
9 1
As put into practice in the Michael M. plurality opinion, intermediate scrutiny
lost even that edge, being blunted upon contact with the essential issue in the case,
which was the relationship between the gender-based classification and its purpose of
deterring teenage pregnancy. It had been argued to the Court that by excluding
females from its coverage, the statutory rape provision was impermissibly un-
derinclusive, because a gender-neutral provision would be equally effective to deter
teenage pregnancy. 92 The plurality opinion rejected this argument on two grounds,
neither of which comport with the requirements of intermediate scrutiny. First, it was
deemed irrelevant that the gender-based provision was no more effective than a
gender-neutral one would be. 93 This stance indulges a greater amount of un-
derinclusiveness than is normally permitted under intermediate scrutiny; in fact, it
indulges a substantial amount of underinclusiveness. Significantly, in taking this
position, Justice Rehnquist's opinion cited but one precedent-Kahn v. Shevin,9 4 a
decision from the nascent stage of intermediate scrutiny, which saw the Court
momentarily regress to the use of minimal scrutiny to deal with a gender-based
classification.95 Not content with this handiwork, Justice Rehnquist found yet another
way to indulge underinclusiveness-by refusing to recognize its presence. His opin-
ion avows an unwilligness to admit that a gender-neutral statutory rape provision
would be as effective as a gender-based one, because the former "may well be
incapable of enforcement." 9 6 As pointed out in a dissenting opinion, this overlooks
the fact that thirty-seven states previously had enacted gender-neutral statutory rape
laws and apparently had encountered no difficulty in enforcing them. 97 This pertinent
data is ignored in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, which heedlessly assumes that the
legislative classification is sufficiently related to its purpose. In persisting in this
assumption despite factual data belying it, the opinion displayed an uncritical def-
erence to governmental action that is typical of minimal, and not intermediate,
scrutiny.
89. 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
90. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980);
Orrv. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
91. 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981).
92. Id. at 473.
93. Id.
94. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
95. Compare id. with cases cited supra note 90. See also L. TRIBE, supra note I, at 1067-70.
96. 450 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1981).
97. Id. at 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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3. Carving Out Exceptions to Strict Scrutiny
Departures from heightened scrutiny also are effectuated by the device of carv-
ing out exceptions to the strict tier of review. Such exceptions have been devised in
several areas, one of which is the right of interstate travel. In a line of cases that
began with Shapiro v. Thompson,9 8 the Court has held that interstate travel is a
fundamental right implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.99 Accordingly, state
residency requirements that impinge upon this right are subject to strict scrutiny, and
will be struck down unless shown to be necessarily related to a compelling state
interest. ° Under this standard, the Court has invalidated residency requirements that
condition eligibility for welfare benefits,' 0 1 voting,102 and free medical care. 10 3 On
the other hand, the Court has summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding
the practice of a state university charging higher tuition rates to nonresidents." °4
Additionally, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County0 5 the Court said that strict
scrutiny is not applicable to residency requirements that do not penalize the right of
interstate travel by denying a necessity of life.10 6 Although the Court has yet to
follow up on this distinction, it opens the door for the development of a substantial
exception from the application of strict scrutiny to residency requirements.
In several cases since Maricopa, the Court has found other ways to exempt from
strict scrutiny state laws that affect the right to travel. The first of these decisions,
Sosna v. Iowa,'0 7 sustained a requirement that a person reside in the state for one year
before being allowed to file a divorce action against a nonresident. Although the state
residency requirement in Sosna affected no fewer than two fundamental rights-the
right of interstate travel as well as the right of marital association' 8-a majority of
the court saw fit to use only minimal scrutiny, on the ground that the area of domestic
relations "has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States." 10 9
In a feeble attempt to support this proposition, the Court cited'three cases, 01 the
latest of which had been decided in 1899, while overlooking no fewer than ten more
recent and more apposite decisions that take an opposite position."' Through this
98. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
99. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
100. See supra note 99.
101. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
102. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
103. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
104. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (striking down an
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence for determining certain students' tuition rates at state-run schools).
105. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
106. Id. at 258-59.
107. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
108. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
109. 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
110. Id. The three cases are: Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Barber
v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
111. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
LEVELS OF SCRUTINY
belaboring of precedent, the Court was able to contrive an exception to the scope of
strict scrutiny.
The approach taken in Sosna was eschewed in a later decision, Jones v.
Helms, 2 which involved a state statute that made it a crime for a parent to willfully
abandon a dependent child. According to the statute, the crime was a misdemeanor
unless the parent left the state after abandoning the child, in which case it was raised
to a felony." 3 Although the statute obviously concerned domestic relations, the
Court made no reference to the Sosna rationale, choosing instead to fashion a differ-
ent exception to strict scrutiny. Although the right to travel is fundamental, the Court
explained, it is not "unqualified," and may be lost, as it was here, through the
commission of a crime."14 Therefore it was concluded that strict scrutiny would not
be applied to the state statute, because it "did not penalize the exercise of the
constitutional right to travel." ' 1 5 In other words, the right to travel is fundamental,
but not always-it is only fundamental when it has not been qualified. Although the
Court's decision in Jones may be correct, its reasoning is open to considerable
question. The premise of the Court's opinion amounts to the tautology that the right
to travel is fundamental when it is fundamental. This sophistry could have been
avoided without changing the resalt in Jones by holding that under strict scrutiny the
fundamental right to travel was outweighed by a compelling state interest in protect-
ing dependent children. Instead, the Court elected to devise yet another exception to
the scope of strict scrutiny.
In Jones and Sosna, the Court was able to avoid the application of heightened
scrutiny by devising an exception to what otherwise would have been recognized as a
fundamental interest calling for the strict level of review. Not only fundamental
interests, however, are subject to this technique; the Court has also eschewed strict
scrutiny by formulating an exception to the suspect classification of alienage. Classi-
fications based on alienage, like those based on race or national origin, have been
held suspect and therefore held to evoke strict scrutiny. 116 Under this analysis, the
Court has struck down state laws" 7 that preclude aliens from eligibility for welfare
benefits," 8 civil service employment,1 9 admission to the bar,' 2 ° scholarships,12'
and the practice of civil engineering. 122 More recently, though, the Court has had
second thoughts about alienage classifications, stating that it is "inappropriate" to
subject all state exclusion of aliens to strict scrutiny, because "to do so would
112. 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
113. Id. at 413.
114. Id. at 420.
115. Id. at 426.
116. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dugall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
117. Because of the "paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization," Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976), the Court is more tolerant of federal regulation of aliens. See id.; Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
118. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
119. Sugarman v. Dugall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
120. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
121. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
122. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
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'obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens.' 123 Therefore, the Court
has decided to exempt alienage classifications from strict scrutiny when they concern
"'matters firmly within a State's consitutional prerogatives.' "124 Using only mini-
mal scrutiny for such matters, the Court has upheld state laws that bar aliens from
employment as state troopers, 125 public school teachers, 126 and deputy probation
officers. 27 By the Court's own admission, its decisions concerning alienage classi-
fications "have not formed an unwavering line." 128 Dissenters from the majority
approach maintain that the Court's decisions concerning alienage are impossible to
reconcile, in that a state has no greater interest in excluding aliens from employment
as state troopers, teachers, or.probation officers than it does in excluding them from
employment as civil servants, attorneys, or engineers. 12 9 Nonetheless, a slim
majority'30 of the Court seems more intent upon avoiding strict scrutiny than in
achieving consistency in these cases. Whether consistent with precedent or not, what
the Court has done in recent cases dealing with alienage classifications is to contrive
yet another exception to the use of strict scrutiny.
C. The Current State of the System
Examination of contemporary cases shows that the Supreme Court's dissatisfac-
tion with the multi-tier system of judicial review is extensive. Several Justices have
gone so far as to openly criticize the system in no uncertain terms. 13 1 More signifi-
cantly, departures from the system already are numerous and continue to mount.
132
Deviation from the system may occur overtly or covertly, but occur it does, and it can
be found in all three levels of scrutiny. Defections from the system happen often
enough that they may no longer be dismissed as mere lapses or aberrations. There are
now so many ways to depart from the system that it frequently is impossible to know
what level of scrutiny will be applied in a particular case. In short, the system is
attenuated to such a degree that it may be beyond repair.
III. FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM
The strains that have appeared in the system of multi-level review can be traced
to flaws in the system itself. Justice Marshall's outline of these flaws' 33 can be used
as a starting point for a deeper comprehension of them.
123. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978) (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 14 (1977)).
124. Id. at 296 (quoting Sugarman v. Dugall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
125. Id.
126. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
127. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
128. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72 (1979).
129. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 81-90 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 302-07 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 310-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Foley v. Connelie was a 6-3 decision, whereas Ambach v. Norwick and Cabell v. Chavez-Salido were 5-4
decisions.
131. See supra subpart II(A).
132. See supra subpart II(B).




Perhaps the most obvious flaw of the multi-level system is its rigidity. 134 Under
the system, decisionmaking is initiated with a heavy finger pressing upon one or
another of three predetermined places on the constitutional scale. As a result, the
ultimate acceptance or rejection of government action strongly depends upon, and
may even be foreordained by, the level of scrutiny that obtains in a given case. In
situations calling for minimal scrutiny, government action is almost automatically
sustained, while in situations calling for strict scrutiny, it is almost automatically
struck down. This inflexibility gives the Court no other choice but to either render
questionable decisions or to deviate from the norms of the system.
The system's rigidity is most pronounced in the minimal tier of review. Since
minimal scrutiny is virtually no scrutiny, the Court has no other option but to uphold
irrational legislation or manipulate the standards of minimal scrutiny to strike down
the legislation. In the vast majority of minimal scrutiny cases, the Court takes the
former course of action and sustains legislation by pretending it is reasonable,
although the Court must know that the opposite is true. In those few instances when
the Court takes the latter course of action, it is required, as we have seen, 135 to
transform minimal scrutiny into a more heightened mode of review. If the alternatives
available under minimal scrutiny were not so limited, it might not have been neces-
sary for the Court to fashion an intermediate tier of review. 136 Although the creation
of intermediate scrutiny elevated some cases from the rigidity of the lowest tier, it did
nothing to enhance the options available in those cases that remain subject to only
minimal scrutiny. Thus, judicial review in the minimal tier remains inflexible. In the
last few years, a minority of Justices have become frustrated with this inflexibility,
asserting that minimal scrutiny should not be so "toothless" as to allow legislation to
be sustained by "flimsy or implausible justifications ... proffered after the fact by
Government attorneys." 137 But, although minimal scrutiny could be restored to its
original status, which granted substantial but not total deference to the other branches
of government, 138 a majority of the Court has not yet been willing to do so.
Moreover, even if minimal scrutiny were to be rehabilitated, it is not certain that
the multi-tier system would provide sufficient flexibility for the Court. It has already
been observed that manipulation of the standards of the system occurs not only in the
lowest tier, but in all three of them, 139 which is a strong indication that the Court
finds the overall system too rigid. This may be because the system, if honestly
followed, allows little discretion in choosing which tier of scrutiny to apply in a given
case. If present in a case, various factors trigger a particular level of scrutiny, which
the Court is then obligated to use. In turn, this may lead the Court to undesirable
134. See Gunther, supra note 1, at 8-12.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 60-80.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
137. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 605-11 (1979) (White, J., dissenting); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 510 (1976).
138. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 60-132.
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decisions, which can only be avoided by manipulating the criteria of the system. It
may be, then, that even with refurbishing, the system as a whole is too rigid.
B. Inhibition of Analysis
Another deficiency of the multi-tier approach is that it hampers legal analysis by
focusing the inquiry toward abstractions that are divorced from the specific merits of
a case. Under the system attention is concentrated on conceptions about classifica-
tions, interests, levels of scrutiny, and the like, to the extent that the actual merits of a
case are neglected, if not lost altogether in the shuffle. The system channels attention
away from the particular issues and factual details of cases and toward general
questions about the level of scrutiny that should be adopted. After reading the Court's
opinions in constitutional cases or the briefs submitted therein, one frequently comes
away with a sense of having seen the forest but not the trees. Under the multi-level
system, cases become primarily concerned with the problem of judicial review, to the
exclusion of the specific disputes that gave rise to them.
Additionally, the multi-level system impedes legal analysis, in a most serious
way, by imposing categories upon the constitutional balancing process. All con-
stitutional adjudication, regardless of the structure through which it is accomplished,
necessarily entails a balancing or comparative evaluation of governmental and in-
dividual interests. 140 The essential issue in all constitutional cases is whether the
governmental interests promoted by state regulations are sufficiently important to
outweigh the individual interests thereby restricted. 14 1 Short of abolishing judicial
review, there is no way to eliminate the balancing process from constitutional
decisionmaking, and the multi-tier system certainly does not do so. It does, how-
ever, filter the appraisal of interests through a priori categories, with each level of
scrutiny depending upon several of these categories, such as "valid state interest,"
"fundamental right," "suspect classification," and the like. This results in a species
of constitutional adjudication that can be described as categorical balancing. 14 2
The a priori categories by which the multi-level approach operates are abstract
generalizations. As such, they dilute constitutional analysis. Individual rights are
conceptualized as either fundamental or not, with nothing in between. Classifications
of individuals are thought of as suspect, almost suspect, or nonsuspect, but nothing
else. Governmental ends may be compelling, important, valid, or invalid, but no
other possibilities are conceivable. Governmental means may be necessary, sub-
stantial, rational, or irrational, but there the list ends. This sort of categorical thinking
squeezes the appraisal of interests into prefabricated boxes that allow for no variation
beyond their own dimensions. Stringently confined as it is- categorical balancing
140. See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75, 75-80. See generally Miller
& Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Shaman, Constitutional
Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 236 (1983); Shaman, The Constitution, the
Supreme Court, and Creativity, 9 HASTINGS CON T. L.Q. 257 (1982).
141. See supra text accompanying note 140.
142. This sort of categorical or definitional balancing is discussed in the context of the first amendment in Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALI.
L. REv. 935 (1968). See also G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrTrnONAL LAW 1334 n.3 (10th ed. 1980).
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does not provide adequate calibration for evaluating the diverse interests that arise in
constitutional litigation.
Categorical balancing exacerbates the rigidity of the multi-tier approach by
increasing its propensity to predetermine the result of cases. The a priori labels
ascribed to governmental and individual interests tend to preordain their con-
stitutional fate. Through the categorization of governmental and individual interests,
their evaluation is diffused, and their relative merit is prejudged.
C. Internal Inconsistency
The a priori categories used in the multi-level system have not always been
capable of providing internal stability for the system. In fact, internal inconsistency
has plagued several of the categories that have been stalwarts of the system, begin-
ning with the category of suspect classifications. Early in the history of the multi-tier
approach, the Court defined a suspect classification as one directed at a "discrete and
insular minorit[y]." 143 Later cases described a suspect class as consisting of persons
"'subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."' 144 A suspect classification can be identified as a
badge or stigma of inferiority, 145 and often is based upon an immutable trait or
accident of birth or condition. 146 Race is the paradigm suspect classification, and has
been recognized as such by the Supreme Court.' 47 Although the historical impetus for
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment was the abolition of racial discrimination,
the fourteenth amendment, unlike the fifteenth, contains no mention of race, and the
Court has not limited its application to racial discrimination.- Nor has the Court
restricted the category of suspect classifications to race; it has ruled that classifica-
tions based upon national origin' 48 or alienage149 both are suspect, and, like those
based upon race, are therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
There are, however, other classifications that fit the Court's own definition of
being suspect that the Court has nevertheless refused or failed to acknowledge as
such. In Frontiero v. Richardson,150 a plurality of the Court could not convince the
majority to declare gender a suspect classification,15' despite the fact that classifica-
tions based upon gender possess all of the attributes of being suspect and despite the
fact that women have been subject to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment" as
143. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
144. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973)).
145. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
146. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Weberv. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
175 (1972).
147. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1969); Anderson v.
Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
148. See Oyoma v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
149. See supra note 116 (citing eases).
150. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
151. Id. Compare the Frontiero plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, with concurring opinions written by
Justices Stewart and Powell and the dissenting opinion written by Justice Rehnquist.
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well as being relegated to "a position of political powerlessness."S 2 Similarly, the
Court has refused to recognize that illegitimacy fits the definition of a suspect
class, 153 and has placed classifications based upon illegitimacy, along with those
based upon gender, in the intermediate tier of review. Other classifications that
readily could be defined as suspect have been left by the Court in the minimal tier of
review. The Court has bypassed opportunities to declare that classifications based
upon wealth (or lack of it), 154 homosexuality, 5 5 and mental illness 156 are suspect,
leaving all of them prone only to the lowest form of scrutiny.
These cases manifest an internal inconsistency within the multi-level system.
Unwilling to abide by its own definition of a suspect classification, the Court takes
classifications that, according to its own logic, should be grouped together and
randomly scatters them among all three tiers of review.
Internal inconsistency also afflicts another multi-level category, that of fun-
damental interests. Originally, an interest was deemed fundamental because the
Court thought it to be of extreme social significance. 157 This approach opened the
Court to the criticism that it was reverting to natural law formulations in deciding
constitutional matters. 158 This criticism, though, was not entirely accurate, in that the
Court did not purport to discover fundamental interests in the nature of things, but
rather created fundamental interests for its own reasons. 159 Still, the Court's approach
to the recognition of fundamental interests was subjective, and hence prone to in-
consistency. The right of privacy, for example, was fundamental to the Court's way
of thinking,' 60 but property rights were not.'61 Although these sorts of ultimate value
judgments are unavoidable in decisionmaking, some persons find their nonobjectiv-
ity disquieting. At any rate, in 1973 the Court moved to curtail the conception of
fundamental interests by ruling that only those rights explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the text of the Constitution are fundamental. 162 This definition of fun-
damental interests, while more objective than the former one, does not by any means
eliminate all subjectivity; what is implicitly-and at times even explicitly-
guaranteed by the Constitution is a matter of indeterminate judgment. Thus, the
Court's delineation of fundamental interests has remained inconsistent. The right to
152. See supra text accompanying'note 144.
153. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Matthews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976).
154. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
155. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
156. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
157. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
158. See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law.Due.Process For-
mula," 16 UCLA L. REV. 716 (1969).
159. There is an essential difference between the methodologies of natural and positive law. According to the
former, judges are not the source of law and therefore are under no obligation to explain or justify their decisions.
According to the latter, judges are the source of law, and therefore it is incumbent upon them to base their decisions upon
articulated reasons.
160. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
161. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
162. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
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vote in a state election,1 63 to travel between states,' 64 to have an abortion, 165 and to
live in an extended family,' 66 for instance, are all fundamental interests, whereas the
right to an education, 167 housing,' 6s employment, 169 and subsistence 170 are not.
It can be seen that internal inconsistency, faulty analysis, and rigidity beset the
multi-level system. These basic flaws are the source of the Court's criticism of the
system and increasing deviation from it, which can only lead one to wonder if there is
a better way of structuring constitutional adjudication.
IV. RESTRUCTURING THE SYSTEM
A workable alternative to the multi-level system of judicial review is the unified
structure championed by Justice Marshall.' 7' The multiple tiers could be transformed
readily into a comprehensive system based upon the unitary standard announced in
Mosley, which in all instances would inquire whether there is "an appropriate gov-
ernmental interest suitably furthered" by the governmental action in question.' 72
Like the multi-tier approach, a unified system would provide a framework for the
evaluation of governmental and individual interests. The unified system, though,
would differ in several important respects from the current tiered one.
First, a unified structure would eliminate the rigidity that pervades the present
multiple level approach. With the abolition of tiers, the constitutionality of gov-
ernmental action would not depend upon the level of scrutiny applied in a particular
case. This would obviate the need now felt by the Court in a considerable number of
cases to manipulate principle and precedent in order to reach a proper result. 173 In the
absence of tiers, there obviously would be no reason for the Court to abruptly refuse
to deal with them, as it did in Fullilove v. Klutznick 74 and Rostker v. Goldberg.'
Nor would the Court have reason to manufacture devices to contort the tiers, as it did
in a variety of cases. 176 Thus, adoption of the proposed uniform structure would
remedy the inconsistency and confusion that now prevails because of the Court's
unpredictable but not uncommon deviations from the multi-level approach.
Second, a unified system would promote more accuracy in the appraisal of
163. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
164. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
165. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
166. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
167. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
168. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
169. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971) (Marshall,
I., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 29-39.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 47-132.
174. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
175. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
176. See supra subparts II(B)(I)-(3).
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governmental and individual interests. Under the proposed system, attention would
not be diverted away from the specific merits of a case toward abstract questions
concerning judicial review. The eradication of tiers would make such questions
irrelevant, so that the Court could concentrate its inquiry upon the actual merits of
cases. At the same time, the unitary approach would purify judicial review of cate-
gorical thinking. By lifting the shroud of a priori categories, the new structure would
sharpen the Court's focus upon governmental and individual interests, fostering a
more precise evaluation of them. Judicial review would be more direct, more realis-
tic, and more finely attuned.
The essential differences between a unified system of judicial review and a
tiered one can be illustrated by comparing the majority and dissenting opinions in
Plyler v. Doe. 177 As previously mentioned,178 in Plyler the Court was faced with a
state law that denied free public education to the children of illegal aliens. The
dissenting opinion in the case, written by Chief Justice Burger, 179 exemplified the
multi-level approach in its most pristine form. Relying upon the a priori categories of
the multi-tier approach, Chief Justice Burger maintained that the case presented no
invidious classification or fundamental right.' 8 0 Despite the fact that the un-
documented children of illegal aliens are a discrete and powerless minority who have
no control over their illegal status and therefore should not be held responsible for it,
Chief Justice Burger could not say that the classification against them was in-
vidious.18' And, although he conceded that "[t]he importance of education is beyond
dispute,"' 8 2 he could not say that it was fundamental. 183 Working as he was with
limited prefabricated categories, Chief Justice Burger found no invidious classifica-
tion or fundamental right, which compelled him to subject the state law to nothing
more than minimal scrutiny.' 84 Applying minimal scrutiny, he and the other dissent-
ers voted to sustain the law on the ground that it was not "irrational" for a state to
take the position that it does not have the same obligation to provide education to
children who are illegally present in the country as it does to children who are
lawfully present. 1
85
In reaching this point in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger, the
reader might be struck by a certain anomaly, namely, that the Chief Justice insisted
that the state law was not "irrational" only after admitting in the very first sentence
of his opinion that the law was "senseless."' 186 But such oxymorons are endemic to
minimal scrutiny; by pretending that even senseless laws are not irrational, the
minimal tier of review grants absolute deference to the legislature.
The senselessness of the state law in Plyler was more fully explained in the
177. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
179. Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
180. 457 U.S. 202; 244-48 (1982).
181. Id. at 244-46.
182. Id. at 247.
183. Id. at 247-48.
184. Id. at 248.
185. Id. at 250.
186. Id. at 242.
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Court's majority opinion, which was written by Justice Brennan.' 87 He was able to
deal more thoroughly with the state law by adopting an approach that approximates
the unified system. While noting that the state law fell into none of the categories that
invoke heightened scrutiny, Justice Brennan's opinion stated that more was involved
in the case than the "abstract question" whether the law discriminated against a
suspect class or infringed upon a fundamental right. 188 This extricated the majority
from the categorical thinking of the multi-level structure, making it possible to
analyze the state law in more depth. Justice Brennan's opinion then pointed out that
the state law imposed a lifetime hardship, the stigma of illiteracy, upon a discrete
class of children who were not responsible for their status as illegal aliens.' 89 By
depriving these children of a basic education, the opinion noted, the law denied them
the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions and foreclosed any
realistic chance that they may contribute to the progress of the nation.' 90 In light of
these considerations, the majority believed that something akin to intermediate scru-
tiny was appropriate to review the state law in question. 19' So, while the categorical
thinking of the dissent demanded the application of nothing more than minimal
scrutiny, the more open thinking of the majority allowed for a more searching form of
review.
Using this searching form of review, the majority found that there was no
justification for the state law. In support of its position, the state had contended that
its law protected the state's financial condition by discouraging an influx of illegal
immigrants. 19 2 This argument was unconvincing for several reasons. First, since the
dominant incentive for illegal entry into the state was the availability of employment
for parents, and not the provision of education for children, the law was likely to
discourage very few, if any, immigrants from illegally entering the state.' 93 Addi-
tionally, there was no evidence in the record to show that illegal immigrants imposed
a substantial burden on the state's economy.' 94 To the contrary, the existing evidence
suggested that illegal aliens underutilized state services while contributing their labor
and services to the state economy.' 95
The state further attempted to justify its law by arguing that the undocumented
children constituted a special burden on the state's ability to provide quality
education. 196 But once again the state was unable to offer any evidence to back up its
contention. In fact, the district court in which the case had originated had held that the
state failed to present any credible evidence whatsoever to show that undocumented
children were a special burden for the school system.' 97
187. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell also filed concurring opinions.
188. 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 224.




196. Id. at 229.
197. Id.
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Finally, the state asserted that these children could appropriately be singled out
because their illegal status made them less probable than other children to remain in
the state and put their education to productive use. 198 This assertion was unpersuasive
by virtue of its gross overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. The record was clear
that many undocumented children did remain in the state indefinitely, some of whom
eventually become legal citizens.1 99 And of course there were mahy children who
were lawful residents of the state who would leave it before putting their education to
productive use there. 200
All of this goes to show that the state law in Plyler was "senseless"-it accom-
plished none of the purposes set out for it by the state itself. The majority opinion in
the case was able to reveal this senselessness and therefore strike down the law by
adopting an approach similar to the unitary framework. On the other hand, the
dissenting opinion, mired in the rigidity and categorical thinking of the multi-level
structure, could only stand by helplessly, blinking its eye at the senselessness of the
state law before it.
Plyler demonstrates that the conversion from a multi-level system to a unified
one would affect the outcome of some cases. This would not occur in many instances,
but it would occur in some, particularly within the realms of what are now minimal
and strict scrutiny. In fact, the proposed system would in all probability have its
greatest impact upon those two areas. With the increased flexibility as well as more
direct and sharper focus provided by the unitary structure, it is unlikely that gov-
ernmental action would be almost automatically accepted as it now is under minimal
scrutiny, and unlikely that it would be almost automatically rejected as it now is
under strict scrutiny.
The unified system might breathe renewed life into the areas presently subjected
to minimal scrutiny. The more acute focus of the system would make it more difficult
for the Court to justify legislation that is grossly overinclusive or underinclusive, as is
currently done in the minimal tier.20' Weak recitations from the Court that legislation
"may" be related to a valid purpose 20 2 would be more prone to be revealed for the
pretensions that they are. Similarly, it would be more troublesome for the Court to
sustain legislation on the basis of imaginary or hypothetical state objectives, as
presently happens with minimal scrutiny.2 0 3 General, conclusory statements from the
Court, such as that the legislature apparently believed that a statutory scheme was
"equitable,'24 would be less persuasive than they now are under minimal scrutiny.
In other words, because of its more penetrating focus upon the merits of gov-
ernmental ends and means, the unitary structure probably would not allow the total
198. Id. at 229-30.
199. Id. at 230.
200. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying note 76.
202. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
203. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948).
204. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178 (1980).
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deference to governmental action that currently characterizes minimal scrutiny. 20 5
This would make for a more realistic constitutional jurisprudence, and, combined
with the flexibility of the new system, would alleviate the Court's need to engage in
subterfuge to upgrade minimal scrutiny.
20 6
At the other end of the spectrum of what is currently the multi-level system, the
new system might reduce the harshness of strict scrutiny. Under the proposed system,
if it genuinely can be shown that legislation suitably furthers an appropriate gov-
ernmental purpose, it would be upheld even if it employs what is now referred to as a
suspect classification or if it impinges upon what is now called a fundamental right. It
is highly probable that in nearly all instances such legislation could not be shown to
suitably further an appropriate governmental interest; but in those cases in which it is
shown, the legislation would be sustained under the new system-as it should be.
Within the domain of what is presently strict scrutiny, the proposed system
would mitigate the Court's need to carve out artificial distinctions. 20 7 For instance, in
cases involving the right of interstate travel, the more direct and searching appraisal
of state interests that would transpire under the new structure would eliminate the
necessity to twist precedent and logic so as to exempt some residency requirements
from strict scrutiny.20 8 Under the unified framework, in a case such as Jones v.
Helms20 9 it would be unnecessary to resort to such tactics in order to uphold the
statute that elevated the crime of child abandonment from a misdemeanor to a felony
when the abandoning parent left the state. Instead of pretending that the statute did
not penalize the right of interstate travel, as the Court did in Jones,2 10 the new
structure would allow the Court to honestly recognize that the statute did punish the
right of interstate travel, but justifiably so in order to effectuate the overriding state
interest in protecting dependent children. Without changing the result in Jones, the
unitary system could have directed the Court to a more sound basis for its decision.
On the other hand, the one year residency requirement for filing a divorce action
that the Court sustained in Sosna v. Iowa2 11 most likely would meet a different fate
under the unified structure. The decision in Sosna upholding the state residency
requirement rested upon an exception for state laws regarding domestic relations2 12
that would be irrelevant under the new approach. The Court's opinion in Sosna
identified no appropriate state interest that was suitably furthered by the residency
requirement, 2 3 and therefore, the case in all likelihood would be decided differently
under the Mosley analysis.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 20 & 81-83.
206. See supra subpart II(B)(1).
207. See supra subpart II(B)(3).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
209. 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
211. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 108-11.
213. In Sosna, the Court asserted that there was a state interest in protecting the property and custody rights of the
out-of-state spouse. This would not amount to an appropriate state interest, however, unless the state court had jurisdiction
to adjudicate those rights, which is unlikely. Furthermore, the residency requirement could not be said to suitably further
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The proposed system also would reduce much, if not all, of the irregularity that
presently characterizes the Court's decisions involving classifications based upon
alienage.2 14 Rather than grant a categorical exemption to alienage classifications
within the domain of state sovereignty, as is done now, 2 15 a more searching examina-
tion of state interests could be accomplished within the new structure. When the state
could demonstrate that its legislation was suitably furthering an appropriate interest in
protecting its sovereign functions, alienage classifications would be permissible; but
when such a showing could not be made, the classifications would be impermissible.
Rather than categorizing interests, the Court would be balancing them more pre-
cisely.
It should be emphasized that the unitary structure itself is essentially ideolog-
ically neutral. Although no structure can eliminate the need for value judgments in
decision-making, the unitary structure does not assign values to the governmental and
individual interests being balanced upon the constitutional scale, since only the Court
can do that. Hence, the new system would favor neither "conservative" nor "lib-
eral" positions. What it would accomplish would be the enhancenent of the Court's
perception of interests by making the Court more perspicacious. The heightened
vision provided by the system may affect the results in some cases, but it will not
realign the Court's value judgments.
V. CONCLUSION
At this point in American constitutional history, it is fair to say that the multi-
level system of judicial review has outlived its usefulness. Spawned as a reaction to
the political exigencies of the New Deal Court crisis,2 16 the multi-tier approach
may have had some strategical value at one time, but it never has been able to provide
a theoretically sound framework for constitutional adjudication. As a system of
judicial review, it always has been and always will be an overly rigid structure that
retards constitutional analysis by diverting thought away from the merits of cases and
by constricting thought through a priori categories. 2 17 Continuous tinkering with the
multi-level system over the years since its inception has not been able to remedy its
fundamental defects, and, in fact, may actually have made matters worse. Even the
major revision of adding an intermediate tier of scrutiny has proven to be little more
than a stopgap.
Because of its basic defects, the"multi-tier system severely restricts the ability of
the Supreme Court to establish a healthy constitutional jurisprudence. The system
that state interest, since that interest was left completely unprotected in situations where the complaining spouse lived
within the state for at least one year.
The Court also asserted that there was a state interest in minimizing the susceptibility of its divorce decrees to
collateral attack. But this would not amount to an appropriate state interest unless the one-year residency requirement
somehow provided additional security to divorce decrees, which is doubtful. In short, the Court seemed to assume that the
residency requirement suitably furthered an appropriate state interest, whereas deeper examination probably would have
revealed that it did not.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 116-30.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 123-30.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 2-18.
217. See supra part Inl.
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frequently leaves the Court with no other choice but to uphold extremely dubious
governmental action or to strike it down by departing from the system through the
distortion of precedent and logic. Needless to say, this infests constitutional law with
considerable disorder.
By now it is no exaggeration to say that the multi-level system has reached a
point of substantial disarray. As we have seen, deviation from the system has become
so common as to render constitutional adjudication a desultory affair.21 Given the
basic flaws of the multi-tier system, it is most improbable that this deviation will
abate in the future. Changes in the Court's personnnel are unlikely to improve the
situation without a corresponding change in the Court's method of decision-making.
If constitutional law is ever again to enjoy a fair degree of coherence and stability, it
will be necessary to convert the multi-level approach to a unified system of judicial
review.
218. See supra subparts 11(A)-(C).

